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THE OHIO SUPREME COURT'S
INTERPRETATION OF THE POLLUTION
EXCLUSION CLAUSE-A STEP NOT YET TAKEN
W. Roger Fry* & Jonathan P. Saxton**
I.

INTRODUCTION

One year ago, we described the area of law surrounding insurance
coverage for environmental matters as a "state of flux." 1 Even this oneyear time period has borne that oversimplified statement true. Although the Ohio Supreme Court has only recently been presented with
the issue and has not ruled on it, courts in other jurisdictions have
taken important clarifying strides, while others appear to be stumbling
through the interpretive maze of analyzing and applying the pollution
exclusion clause in the comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance policy.
Our focus here is on the most recent judicial interpretations of the
pollution exclusion clause. Most CGL policies included this standard
clause from 1973 to 1986. The clause excluded coverage for pollution
unless the pollution was sudden and accidental. The clause provides:
It is agreed that the insurance does not apply to bodily injury or property
damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of
smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or
gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into
or upon land, the atmosphere, or any watercourse or body of water; but
this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release, or
escape is sudden and accidental.2
Although we recognize that an effort to address the "most recent"
cases must fail on its own since new cases are constantly being decided,.
*
B.S., University of Cincinnati, 1962; J.D., Salmon P. Chase, 1966. Mr. Fry is a partner in
the firm of Rendigs, Fry, Kiely & Dennis with concentration in commercial and environmental
litigation.
** B.S., Miami University, 1986; J.D., University of Cincinnati College of Law, 1989. Mr.
Saxton is an associate in the firm of Rendigs, Fry, Kiely & Dennis with concentration in environmental litigation.
1. See Fry & Saxton, Interpreting the Pollution Exclusion Clause in the Comprehensive
General Liability Policy - Ohio's Next Step, 23 AKRON L. REv. 507 (1990).

2. Insurance Services Office, Inc., Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Coverage
Part, Form No. L6394 (Ed. 1-73) (emphasis added to the so-called exception to the pollution
exclusion). This portion of the clause has by far spawned the most litigation and generated the
greatest number of written decisions. The greatest controversy has been over the definition of
"sudden." Nevertheless, the definition of "accidental" has also been at issue in cases, as has
whether the exception to the exclusion must be read in the conjunctive.
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it is both possible and necessary to identify and analyze trends along

with prevailing and persuasive lines of reasoning.
The dollars involved in providing a remedy for the environmental
problems in this country are staggering. 3 At the same time, current
environmental law generally applies a strict liability standard wherein a
responsible party may be held liable for cleanup costs regardless of the
degree of culpability of that individual or entity.4 Moreover, under the
doctrine of joint and several liability, one party may be held liable for a
share of the cleanup costs far beyond its own actual contribution to the
particular site or problem. 5 These parties are looking to their insurers
to pay for reimbursement. With unidentifiable risks too great to insure,
insurance companies added a special exclusion - the pollution exclusion clause. Courts have deemed the language selected for this clause
less than a success in clearly excluding the majority of pollution

claims. 6
As a result, by the mid-1980s many insurers ceased to offer new
insurance policies covering pollution-related damages. 7 Insurers began
to withdraw from the pollution market. 8 This exit resulted from environmental legislation and court interpretations of environmental law

3. According to one recent government study, the average cost for remedying a single
Superfund site is at least $29 million. United States General Accounting Office, Report to the
Chairman, Subcommittee on Policy Research and Insurance, Committee on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, House of Representatives: Hazardous Waste, Pollution Claims Experience of Property/Casualty Insurers, at 2 (Feb. 1991) (available from the United States General Accounting
Office) [hereinafter General Accounting Office Report]. Of course, claims are often made on numerous insurance companies by literally hundreds of potentially responsible parties. The examination of the critical economic issues involved in environmental clean-up is beyond the scope of this
article.
4. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) imposes strict liability for the past handling, transportation, storage, treatment and disposal
of hazardous waste upon the site owners and operators, and on the waste generators and transporters. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Whereas CERCLA focuses on past
conduct, the Resource Conservation and Recovery'Act (RCRA) is the "cradle to grave" regulation of hazardous waste. RCRA established procedures by which standards were promulgated that
are applicable to generators and transporters of hazardous waste, and owners and operators of
hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities (TSDF). 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1982
& Supp. V 1987). Liability may also be grounded upon common law theories.
5. For example, various courts have held that CERCLA imposes joint and several liability
on defendants for response costs. See, e.g., United States v. Western Processing Co., 734 F. Supp.
930 (W.D. Wash. 1990).
6. In the words of United States District Court Judge Crow, "an abundance of authority is
generally desirable, except when it is extensively and sharply divided as with the issues" of insurance coverage for environmental damages. United States Fidelity & Guar. v. Morrison Grain Co.,
734 F. Supp. 437, 443 (D. Kan. 1990).
7. General Accounting Office Report, supra note 3, at 3.
8. Id.
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which broadened the liability exposure of the insurance carriers for policy coverage. 9
Nonetheless, thousands of these policies were in place through the
1970s and up to the mid-1980s. As we now know, by today's standards,
pollution of the environment was taking place at an alarming rate during this time. Although many sites have now been identified, more are
being identified all the time, and new claims are being asserted for insurance coverage. The recurring issue in litigation resulting from these
claims is the interpretation and application of the pollution exclusion
clause.
The Ohio courts, which continue to refer to the clause as the "polluters exclusion," 10 have written three decisions in the 1990s interpreting the clause. 1 These Ohio courts have followed existing Ohio precedent, finding the pollution exclusion to be ambiguous. 2 A finding that
the pollution exclusion clause is ambiguous is nearly tantamount to assuring the party's coverage for the occurrence, regardless of the facts of
the case, as an ambiguous clause is construed against the insurance
company.' 3 That is, the pollution exclusion would be equated with the
definition of occurrence, which is defined elsewhere in the policy, and
the clause would be rendered a nullity. One federal court, applying
Ohio law, has reached a contrary conclusion, finding that the pollution
exclusion clause was not ambiguous.' 4 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this holding,' 5 and the United States Supreme Court de-

9. Id. The extension of comprehensive general liability insurance policies to environmental
claims, according to one commentator, has caused the "exodus of the insurance industry from the
environmental field." Chemers & Franco, The Contemporary View of the Pollution Exclusion - A
Provincial Approach, in MONOGRAPH: SELECTED ISSUES IN INSURANCE COVERAGE AND PRACTICE - DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (1990).
10. This apparently is a carry-over from Ohio's first interpretation of the pollution exclusion
clause. Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents and Chemicals Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477
N.E.2d 1227 (1984).
11. Hybud Equipment Corp. v. Sphere Drake, C.A. No. 14597 (Summit County Ct. App.,
Jan. 20, 1991) (LEXIS, States file, Ohio library), cert. granted, No. 91-641 (Ohio July 3, 1991);
Morton Thiokol v. Harbor Ins., No. 89-03914 (Hamilton County C.P., Feb. 1, 1991); Morton
Thiokol v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., No. 86-03799 (Hamilton County C.P., Mar. 1, 1990). The
impart of a finding of ambiguity is that the insurance policy will be construed in favor of the
insured.
12. Buckeye Union, 17 Ohio App. 3d at 132, 477 N.E.2d at 1233; Kipin Industries, Inc. v.
American Universal Ins. Co., 41 Ohio App. 3d 228, 232, 535 N.E.2d 334, 338 (1987).
13. Of course, for there to be coverage under an insurance policy, all provisions of the policy
must be considered including definitions, notice requirements, and exclusions. This article deals
solely with the pollution exclusion clause.
14. Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 927, 929-30 (S.D. Ohio 1987),
aff'd, 865 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 68 (interim ed. 1989). A finding that
the clause is not ambiguous means that the applicability of insurance coverage depends, as it
should, on the particular facts of the case. That is, whether the release of the pollutants' was in
fact sudden
and accidental,
giving those words their ordinary meanings.
Published
by eCommons,
1990
15. Borden, 865 F.2d 1267.
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nied review."6 The two Ohio appellate courts which have considered the
issue are not in conflict, and the Ohio Supreme Court has not reviewed
the issue. We believe, based on an analysis of all of the cases which
have addressed this issue, and particularly the recent cases which have
thoroughly and completely identified and analyzed the issues, that the
Ohio Supreme Court will find in a matter contrary to the appellate
courts sitting in Hamilton and Summit counties and in a manner consistent with the better reasoned holdings.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE LAW

The older and now clearly minority view throughout the country
holds that the pollution exclusion clause is flawed by ambiguity.17 Ambiguity in an insurance contract under Ohio law, and under most
states' rules of construction, is to be interpreted against the insurance
company.18 As a result, an initial finding of ambiguity behind the
meaning of the pollution exclusion clause generally leads to a holding
that coverage exists for a particular matter as to a particular insured.
This older line of case law which originated in New Jersey no longer
represents the national consensus.' 9
The more rational approach holds that the pollution exclusion
clause itself is not ambiguous, and that coverage depends on the particular factual scenario of the case. This rejects the contorted conclusion
that the "sudden and accidental" exception language within the exclusion is merely a restatement of the definition of occurrence within the
body of the policy.2 0

16. Borden, 110 S.Ct. 68 (interim ed. 1989).
17. Buckeye Union Insurance Company v. Liberty Solvents and Chemicals Co., 17 Ohio
App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (1984), is one example. The court followed an early trend which
emerged from the New Jersey appellate courts. See Jackson Township Mun. Utilities Auth. v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990 (1982); Lansco, Inc. v.
Dept. of Environmental Protection, 138 N.J. Super. 275, 350 A.2d 520 (1975), aff'd, 145 N.J.
Super. 433, 368 A.2d 363 (1976), cert. denied, 73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322 (1977).
18. See, e.g., King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St. 3d 208, 519 N.E.2d 1318 (1988)
(declaratory judgment action to determine insureds); see also Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Wright,
17 Ohio St. 2d 73, 246 N.E.2d 552 (1969).
19. In fact, even a New Jersey trial court has criticized the continued adherence to the New
Jersey precedent. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co. v. Aetna Casualty, 231 N.J. Super. 1, 554
A.2d 1342 (App. Div. 1989). More recently, the United States District Court for Rhode Island,
applying New Jersey law, predicted that the New Jersey Supreme Court when presented with the
interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause would not follow the New Jersey appellate courts'
decisions. CPC Int'l v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 759 F. Supp. 966 (D.R.I. 1991)
(applying New Jersey law). Nonetheless, Buckeye Union, which is based on the early New Jersey
opinions, continues to influence Ohio appellate courts.
20. Several courts have soundly criticized certain judicial interpretations of the meanings of
"sudden and accidental." "[C]ourts, in a quest for finding [insurance] coverage, have strained the
plain meaning of the terms and circumvented the obvious scope of the clause; . . .the common
sense meaning of simple terms should not be contorted into a vehicle for reaching a planned
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/4
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The number of cases following this approach, holding that the pollution exclusion clause is not ambiguous per se, is growing. The cases
decided in 1990 and 1991, however, still reflect a split of authority. 2
Although Ohio does not clearly fall into either approach, the status of
the law in Ohio is consistent with yet another characteristic of the
emerging law in this area, that being the federal-state split in authority. The ,federal courts seated in Ohio, and applying Ohio law, have
reached conclusions which are contrary to the Ohio appellate courts.
Interestingly, this has also occurred in other states.2 The federal courts
have consistently concluded that state supreme courts, when presented
with the issue, will find that the pollution exclusion is not ambiguous
and its applicability depends on the facts of the case.
A.

1990 Cases

While some courts in 1990 found that the pollution exclusion
clause was per se ambiguous, the majority of courts presented with the
issue held that the exception to the exclusion does not render the entire
clause ambiguous.
Perhaps no case more clearly illustrates the point that words must
be given their plain and ordinary meaning than the Iowa Supreme
Court decision in Weber v. I.M.T. Insurance Co.2 a The issue in this
' The
case was whether hog manure constituted "waste material." 24
insured argued that the term "waste material" was ambiguous and that
hog manure should not be considered waste material.2 5 The Iowa Supreme Court noted that "waste material" was not defined within the
insurance policy, and that it was required to give the term its ordinary
meaning." The court made short order of the insured's argument that
the terms of the insurance policy were ambiguous; it held that the ordi-

destination." United States Fidelity & Guar. v. Morrison Grain Co., 734 F. Supp. 437, 445-46
(D. Kan. 1990).
21. Case law up to 1990 was discussed in a prior article. See Fry & Saxton, supra note 1.
For analysis of cases decided in 1990 and 1991 see infra notes 23-82 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 83-103 and accompanying text.
23. 462 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 1990).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 285.
at 286.
Published26.by Id.
eCommons,
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nary meaning of waste material encompasses hog manure spilled on the
road. 7
Although on occasion courts must address the definition of pollutants and waste material, the majority of the decisions deal with the
definitions of "sudden" and "accidental." For example, in what appears
to be the first interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause by a Colorado state court, an appellate court in West American Insurance Co. v.
F. W. Baumgartner 8 held that "sudden" was to be given a temporal
dimension. 29 The court held that the pollution exclusion clause was not
ambiguous and that only when a discharge is both sudden and accidental would there be insurance coverage under the exception to the
30
exclusion.
In 1990, the Florida courts completed their evolution from the
state's mid-1980s case law to reject earlier Florida precedent and accord the terms 'sudden and accidental their ordinary meanings.31 In
other states, courts simply adhered to standing precedent that the exclusion clause is unambiguous.3 2

27. Id. The court ultimately found that no insurance coverage was owed because the spillage of the manure was not accidental within the meaning of the exception to the pollution exclusion. Id. at 287-88.
28. 812 P.2d 969 (Colo. App. 1990).
29. Id.(rejecting City of Northglenn v. Chevron USA, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 217 (D. Colo.
1986)). The court cited F.L. Aerospace v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 897 F.2d 214 (6th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990) and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Morrison Grain Co., 734 F. Supp. 437 (D. Kan. 1990) in support of its holding.
30. West American Ins. Co., 812 P.2d 969. See also Mays v. Transamerica, 103 Ore. App.
578, 799 P.2d 653 (1990). In Oregon's second interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause, the
court found no ambiguity between the definition of occurrence as used within the policy and
within the exclusion clause. Mays, 103 Ore. App. at 585, 799 P.2d at 657.
31. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida in Industrial Indemnification Co. v. Crown Auto Dealerships,Inc., 731 F. Supp. 1517 (M.D. Fla. 1990), rejected
a 1985 federal case, Payne v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 625 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.
Fla. 1985), in which Florida law was applied. The Crown Auto Dealerships court found that
"sudden" contained a temporal dimension, and that an accident is an event which is unexpected or
unintended and does not take place within the usual course of events. Crown Auto Dealerships,
731 F. Supp. at 1520.
32. Two federal courts applying Pennsylvania law followed established Pennsylvania precedent that the pollution exclusion clause was not per se ambiguous. The court in Northern Insurance Co. v. Aardvark Associates, 743 F. Supp. 379 (W.D. Pa. 1990), predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would follow the established Pennsylvania appellate precedent. Id. at 380
(citing United States Fidelity & Guar. v. Korman Corp., 693 F. Supp. 253 (E.D. Pa. 1988);
American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Neville Chem. Co., 650 F. Supp. 929 (W.D. Penn. 1987);
Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 656 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1986)). Also, in
Armotek Indus., Inc. v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, No. 88-3110 (D.N.J. Oct. 15, 1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), a district court sitting in New Jersey, applying Pennsylvania
law, found that a long-term release and disposal of pollutants which caused groundwater contamination would be excluded by the policy's pollution exclusion clause. See also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morrison Grain Co., 734 F. Supp. 437 (D. Kan. 1990) (court followed Kansas
precedent and expressly rejected scores of older cases).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/4
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In some jurisdictions the federal courts have certified to the state's
highest court the issues of interpretation of the pollution exclusion
clause. The United States District Court for Massachusetts certified
two issues to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. 33 Massachusetts' highest court in Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Belleville
Industries,4 noted at the outset that its analysis would be strictly a
legal one.35 The court examined the word "sudden" in conjunction with
the word "accidental," and concluded that sudden had a temporal dimension. 36 Under the court's holding, the release of the pollutants must
have occurred suddenly; neither the cause of the release nor the damage caused by the release are the determining factors.3 7 The court
noted that it was following the more recent judicial interpretations of
the pollution exclusion clause. 38 The Lumbermen's case was quickly applied in several pending cases in Massachusetts.3 9

33. In re Acushnet River and New Bedford Harbor, 725 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mass. 1989).
The court accepted the certified issues and rendered its decisions in Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Belleville Industries, 407 Mass. 675, 555 N:E.2d 568 (1990). The Michigan Supreme
Court, however, declined to answer a similar certified question put to it in InternationalSurplus
Lines v. Anderson Development, 432 Mich. 1239 (1989). See also F.L. Aerospace v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 897 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1990).
34. 407 Mass. 675, 555 N.E.2d 568 (1990).
35. "We, of course, reject any temptation to let our own ideas of public policy concerning
the desirability of insurance coverage for environmental damage guide our legal conclusions;" Id.
at 679-80, 555 N.E.2d at 571.
36. Id. at 680, 555 N.E.2d at 572. The court also stated that release must be accidental, in
addition to abrupt, for there to be coverage for an occurrence arising out of the discharge of
pollutants.
37. Id. at 679, 555 N.E.2d at 571.
38. Id. (citing United States Fidelity & Guar. v. Star Fire Coals, 856 F.2d 31 (6th Cir.
1988); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O, 702 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1988); State v.
Amro Realty Corp, 697 F. Supp. 99 (N.D.N.Y. 1988), afid, 936 F.2d 1420 (2nd Cir. 1991);
Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Ohio 1987), affd, 865 F.2d'1267
(6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 68 (interim ed. 1989); American Mototists v. General
Host Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1423 (D. Kan. 1987), vacated, No. 88-1503 (10th Cir., Aug. 29, 1991)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file); Technicon Elect. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co.,
141 A.D.2d 124, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1988), afid, 74 N.Y.2d 66, 542 N.E.2d 1048, 544 N.Y.S.2d
531 (1989)).
39. Covenant Ins. Co. v. Friday Eng'g, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 708 (D. Mass. 1990) (case originally stayed during certification of questions from In re Acushnet River and New Bedford Harbor, 725 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mass. 1989)); Goodman v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., No. 88-0052
(Mass. Super. Court Sept. 28, 1990) (the court followed the recent "landmark" decision in Lumbermen's in a case involving a leaking underground gasoline storage tank; it was clear that the
lengthy discharge of gasoline into the soil and groundwater on the plaintiff's property could not be
construed as a sudden occurrence, and hence the exclusion applied); Polaroid Corp. v. Travelers,
No. 88-5207-C (Mass. Super. Court Sept. 28, 1990) (the court also followed Lumbermen's in this
CERCLA case in which the insured conceded that the release of the toxic chemicals was not
sudden and accidental, but argued that the release was not intentional). The court was not swayed
by this argument, stating: "In the present case, there is no abrupt, accidental release, the pollutio
exclusion controls, and Polaroid is not entitled to the cost of cleanup as damages." Polaroid Corp.
v. Travelers, No. 88-5207-C (Mass. Super. Court Sept. 28, 1990).
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The New York decisions were comprehensively reviewed by a federal court in State v. Amro Realty Corp.4 0 That court refused to reconsider its 1988 decision which, at the time it was rendered, varied with
state court decisions on the interpretation of the pollution exclusion
clause. 41 The court acknowledged that at the time of its original order
the law concerning the proper interpretation and application of the
clause was unsettled.4 2 Since 1988, however, both the Court of Appeals
for New York and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit have issued decisions clarifying the circumstances under which
the pollution exclusion operates to preclude insurance coverage and
law. 3 Several
making the 1988 decision consistent with New York
4
4
1990.
during
decided
other New York cases were
Not all courts facing this issue in 1990 held that the pollution exclusion clause was free from ambiguity. In a decision vigorously opposed in a dissenting opinion, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Just v.
Land Reclamation Ltd.45 reversed a court of appeals decision in a case
involving coverage for pollution claims related to a landfill. 48 According
to the court, the insurance policy at issue covered unexpected and unintended pollution damage occurring over a substantial period of time,
notwithstanding the pollution exclusion clause. 47 The court found that
"sudden" is reasonably susceptible to different meanings and, therefore,
ambiguous.48 The court rejected the argument that the phrase "sudden

40. 745 F. Supp. 832 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 836.
43. Id. (citing Avondale Indus. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200 (2nd Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2588 (interim ed. 1990); Powers Chem. Co., Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 74
N.Y.2d 910, 548 N.E.2d 1301, 549 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1989); Technicon Elec. v. American Home, 74
N.Y.2d 66, 542 N.E.2d 1048, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1989)).
44. See Niagara County v. Fireman's Fund, No. 71134 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 6, 1990).
Niagara County was a landfill case in which the court found that the recent court of appeals
decisions in Technicon and Powers Chem. Co were dispositive in that the pollution exclusion is
"unambiguous and operative." Id. It is noteworthy that the court explicitly found that there is no
element of scienter inherent in the exclusion. Id. In E.A.D. Metallurgical v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 905 F.2d 8 (2nd Cir. 1990), the federal court of appeals held that insurance coverage
was excluded where the insured's disposal of pollutants was intentional and continuous - purposeful conduct cannot be considered accidental.
45. 456 N.W.2d 570 (Wis. 1990).
46. Id. But see id. at 579 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting)
The majority has used linguistic legerdemain "now you see it, now you don't" by interpreting the clear words "sudden and accidental" to be ambiguous and as a result to mean
unexpected or unintended. In its zeal to provide insurance coverage where it does not exist,
it has changed an insurance policy into an assurance policy.
Id.
47. Id. at 571-72.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/4
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and accidental" has only a temporal meaning. 4 The court relied upon
and cited numerous cases80 including Buckeye Union Insurance Co. v..
Liberty Solvents and Chemical Co.5 and Kipin Industries, Inc. v.
American Universal Insurance Co., 2 both of which are from Ohio and
badly outdated.
Finally, perhaps the most telling case of 1990 was decided by a
United States District Court in Massachusetts applying the law of the
state of Maine. 83 The courts of Maine have not ruled on the pollution
exclusion clause. The United States Court for the District of Massachusetts, following the rules of interpretation of the state of Maine,
declared that Maine law would join the emerging nationwide judicial
consensus which holds that:
[the] "pollution exclusion" clause is unambiguous, and that an insured
who is accused of causing injury or property damage by the intentional
discharge of pollutants over an extended period of time is bound by the
terms of the exclusion and is not entitled to be defended or indemnified
54
by its insurer.
B.

1991 Cases

The handful of cases decided in 1991 are consistent with what the
United States District Court in Massachusetts declared was the
"emerging nationwide judicial consensus.""8 The 1991 Illinois
Appellate Court decision of Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.56 is part of that consensus. The appellate court reviewed
and analyzed Illinois precedent, which was split between holding that
the clause was ambiguous, and holding that it was unambiguous.5 7 In
49. Id. Similarly, in Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety, No. C86-352WD (W.D.
Wash. April 16, 1990), the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
held that sudden was practically synonymous with unforeseen and unexpected.
50. Id.
51. 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (1984).
52. 41 Ohio App. 3d 228, 535 N.E.2d 334 (1987).
53. A. Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 741 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mass. 1990).
54. Id. at 305 (quoting Technicon Electronics Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 141
A.D.2d 124, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1988)). The court relied upon Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co.
v. Belleville Industries., 407 Mass. 675, 555 N.E.2d 568 (1990). A. Johnson Co. involved gradual
occurrences, and under those circumstances the court held that there was no insurance coverage
owed. A. Johnson Co., 741 F. Supp. 298.
55. A. Johnson Co., 741 F. Supp. at 304. The court indicated that the judicial consensus is
that the pollution exclusion clause is unambiguous. Id.
56. 212 Ill. App. 3d 231, 570 N.E.2d 1154 (1991).
57. Id. at 1163. The Illinois appellate court in International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 168 I11.App. 3d 361, 378, 522 N.E.2d 758, 768 (1988), concluded
that in the context of the clause and the policy as a whole, the phrase was not ambiguous and the
word "sudden" had a temporal connotation. But see United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Wilkin
Insulation Co., 193 I11.App. 3d 1087, 1099, 550 N.E.2d 1032, 1039 (1989); United States Fidelity
Published by eCommons, 1990
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1988, the court in InternationalMinerals and Chemical Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 5a had concluded that in the context of the
clause and the policy as a whole, the phrase was not ambiguous and the
word "sudden" had a temporal connotation.5 9 The court in Outboard
Marine followed International Minerals holding that the word "sudden" is not ambiguous and does have a temporal connotation. The
word is synonymous with "abrupt."61 The court rejected the insured's
62
argument that sudden could be construed to mean unexpected. If
"sudden" is construed to mean unexpected with no temporal connotation, then the word is reduced to "mere surplusage."6 3 The court found
that there was nothing sudden or abrupt about discharges occurring
over an eleven year period. 4 Also in 1991, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit reviewed and affirmed the oft-cited Kansas case, American Motorists Insurance Co. v. General Host Corp.15 The court noted
the sharp division of authority on the issue of whether pollution that
occurs over an extended period of time is sudden while there is an apparent lack of controversy concerning the meaning of the term accidental.6 6 Courts have interpreted "accidental" to refer to pollution which is
not expected or intended by the insured. 7 The court saw an open door
in that the pollution in the case was not accidental, and held that for
68
there to be coverage, the release must be both sudden and accidental.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, applying New York
law, did address the sudden component of the exception to the exclu-

& Guar Co. v. Specialty Coatings, 180 Ill. App. 3d 378, 388, 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1075 (1989);
Reliance Insurance Co. v. Martin, 126 Ill. App. 3d 94, 97-98, 467 N.E.2d 287, 289 (1984).
58. 168 Ill. App. 3d 361, 522 N.E.2d 758 (1988).
59. Id. at 378, 522 N.E.2d at 769.
60. Outboard Marine, 570 N.E.2d at 1163.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. The court defined accidental as "unexpected and unintended. If a party expects an
event to occur, the event cannot reasonably be considered accidental with reference to that party."
Id.
64. Id. at 1164. The court also rejected the argument that the pollution exclusion clause
only applies to persons who actively pollute. Id. at 1163. See also West American Ins. Co. v. F.W.
Baumgartner, 812 P.2d 696 (Colo. App. 1990). The clause was held to exclude pollutants, not
polluters who caused the release. Id. This peripheral point may be instructive on the holdings of
the Ohio courts with their anomaly, "the polluter's exclusion."
65. 667 F. Supp. 1423 (D. Kan. 1987), aff'd, No. 88-1503 (10th Cir. 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Courts file), vacated in part, No. 88-1503 (10th Cir. Aug. 29, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Courts file). The court's review of the district court's order granting summary judgment
was de novo. Id. Upon petition, the court vacated its order in part and remanded due to an improper consideration by the court of certain facts. Id. The court in its order vacating and remanding, reaffirmed its holding relative to the interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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sion. e9 That court held that a release or discharge would be sudden if it
had "occurred over a short period of time."70 The court found that the
allegation of the underlying complaint that contamination occurred
continuously for .thirty-three years did not comport with the definition
of sudden. 7 '
The developments in New Jersey case law have been alluded to
previously. The two most recent cases interpreting the pollution exclusion clause under New Jersey law were decided by two federal courts
sitting outside of New Jersey. In Firemen's Fund Insurance Co. v.
Meenan Oil Co.,72 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York noted that the "decisional law in New Jersey
. . .has tended to interpret the pollution exclusion and, more particularly, the 'sudden and accidental' exception, as simply a 'restatement of
the definition of occurrence.' "' The court followed in step and held
that "the pollution exclusion focuses upon the intention, expectation
and foresight of the insured. ' 7 By contrast, the United States District
Court for Rhode Island, in CPC International,Inc. v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Insurance Co.,75 undertook a detailed analysis of the
New Jersey intermediate court decisions interpreting the pollution exclusion clause. 76 The court noted that the New Jersey Supreme Court
had never interpreted the clause, and concluded that the New Jersey
Supreme Court would refuse to pursue the direction indicated by the
New Jersey appellate courts in the early cases of Jackson Township
Municipal Utilities Authority v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.7 7
and Broadwell Reality Services v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. 78 The court
concluded that the New Jersey Supreme Court would not find ambiguity in the pollution exclusion clause and would follow the plain meaning
of the phrase "sudden and accidental.1 79 The court refused to "engage

69. Ogden v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 924 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1991).
70. Id. at 42. (quoting Technicon Electronics Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 141
A.D.2d 124, 137, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91, 99 (1988), a f'd, 74 N.Y.2d 66, 542 N.E.2d 1048, 544
N.Y.S.2d 531 (1989)). See also E.A.D. Metallurgical, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 905
F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1990).
71. Ogden, 924 F.2d at 42. Additionally, "[u]nder New York law, the contamination of a
site is accidental when the conduct, the activity resulting in pollution, was unintended." Id.
72. 755 F. Supp. 547 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
73. Id. at 550 (quoting Broadwell Realty Services v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 218 N.J.
Super. 516, 528 A.2d 76, 85-86 (1987)).
74. 755 F. Supp. at 550.
75. 759 F. Supp. 966 (D.R.I. 1991).
76. Id. at 971-73.
77. 186 N.J. Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990 (1982).
78. 218 N.J. Super. 516, 528 A.2d 66 (1987); see CPC Int'l, 759 F. Supp. at 973.
79. byCPC
Int'l, 759 F.
Supp. at 973.
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0
in a strained construction to support the imposition of liability."" As
the court noted, "the exclusion would allow coverage only for events
which are accidental, that is, unexpected and unintended and sudden,
that is, which have occurred abruptly, precipitantly or over a short period of time. Coverage for gradual pollution would be barred, . . . as
would coverage for intentional pollution." 8 1 The court stated that this
2
interpretation would be in accord with the courts across the country.

C.

The Federal Court - State Court Split

Under the Erie doctrine, a federal court sitting in a diversity case
must apply the law the state court would apply. 8 With respect to case
law, the law of the state is the most recent pronouncement by the highest court of that state.8" If the highest court has not ruled on a particular issue, then the federal court has the task of anticipating or predicting how the court would rule if faced with the issue. While state
appellate courts would be persuasive in this respect, they are not binding upon the federal court. Therefore, federal courts at times issue rulings in contradiction to state appellate courts. This is common in cases
with issues of insurance coverage and environmental matters.8 5
The split between the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit applying Ohio law and the Ohio appellate and trial courts
is but one example of contradictory decisions. An Ohio appellate court
first interpreted the pollution exclusion clause in 1984 in Buckeye Union
Insurance Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chemical Co.86 The Ohio court
found the phrase "sudden and accidental" within the pollution exclusion clause ambiguous on its face since it was not separately defined
within the policy.8 7 The court went on to hold that the pollution exclu88
sion clause was simply a restatement of the definition of occurrence.
In 1987, an Ohio appellate court sitting in Hamilton County expressly

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
stated:
As a
"civil

Id.
id.
Id.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See Id.
This is particularly true with the pollution exclusion clause. One commentator has

consequence of the high stakes involved, the state and federal courts are fighting a
war" over the interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause in the comprehensive
general liability insurance policy. This civil war pits the "polluting" companies and individuals against their insurers in a battle to determine coverage under the CGL policy.
Greenlaw, The CGL Policy and the Pollution Exclusion Clause: Using the Drafting History to
Raise the Interpretation Out of the Quagmire,.23 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROBS. 233, 233 (1990).
86. 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (1984).
87. Id. at 132, 477 N.E.2d at 1234.
88. Id. at 133, 477 N.E.2d at 1234.
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followed Buckeye Union."9 In reaching its holding in Kipin Industries,
Inc. v. American Universal Insurance Co., the appellate court held that
"an event is 'sudden and accidental', and thus not excluded
from comprehensive coverage, if the damaging result is neither expected nor intended by the insured." 90 Because of its ambiguity, the clause was
strictly construed. 91
That same year, the Sixth Circuit, applying Ohio law, concluded
that the Ohio Supreme Court would not follow Buckeye Union.92 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held
that the pollution exclusion clause was not ambiguous. 93 "Sudden
means happening without previous notice or with very brief notice,"
and "accidental means occurring sometimes with unfortunate results by
chance." The Sixth Circuit interpretation of Ohio law is obviously at
odds with the Ohio appellate court decisions.
Michigan is another example of a state in which the decisions of
state appellate courts are at odds with the federal decisions. The leading Michigan appellate court case was decided in 1986. 9 1 In Jonesville
Products, Inc. v. TransamericaInsurance Group, allegations of continuous pollution fell within the pollution exclusion so long as these continuous releases were unintended.96 Jonesville Products has been followed by subsequent Michigan appellate court decisions, including
Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.97 and Polkow v. Citizens
Insurance.9 8 The federal courts, however, applying Michigan law, have
refused to follow Jonesville Products. The federal courts have focused
on the actual discharge of the pollutants and away from the more neb-

89. Kipin Industries, Inc. v. American Universal Ins. Co., 41 Ohio App. 3d 228, 231, 535
N.E.2d 334, 337 (1987).
90. Id. at 231, 535 N.E.2d at 338.
91. Id. at 232, 535 N.E.2d at 338.
92. Borden Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins., 682 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aft'd, 865 F. 2d
1267 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 68 (interim ed. 1989). "This court is convinced that the
Ohio Supreme Court would not adopt the construction of the pollution exclusion set forth in Buckeye." Borden, 682 F. Supp. at 929.
93. Borden, 682 F. Supp. at 930.
94. Id.
95. Jonesville Prod., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Group, 156 Mich. App. 508, 402 N.W.2d 46
(1986).
96. Id.
97. 178 Mich. App. 706, 444 N.W.2d 813 (1989). The court held that even a continuous
discharge of chemicals may be accidental and sudden, and, therefore, outside the pollution exclusion. Accidental was equated with unintended; sudden was equated with unexpected. The pollution
at issue was leakage from an underground storage tank. Id.
98. 180 Mich. App. 651, 447 N.W.2d 853 (1989). The court found that sudden means
unexpected and that accidental means unintended. Since the plaintiff in this case did not expect or
intend to spill pollutants, plaintiff was entitled to insurance coverage. Id.
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ulous issue of the intent of the insured.99 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in Ray Industries v. Liberty
Mutual' °° was convinced that the Michigan Supreme Court would not
follow Polkow.Y" According to the Ray court, Polkow rewrote the insurance contract by collapsing the definition of occurrence and the exceptions of the pollution exclusion. 102 The court found that discharges
that took place continuously and regularly for approximately thirteen
years could not be sudden and accidental."'
III.

Focus

ON RECENT OHIO CASES

Since the early Ohio cases interpreting the pollution exclusion
clause were decided, Buckeye Union Insurance Co. v. Liberty Solvents
& Chemical Co.' °4 in 1984 and Kipin Industries, Inc. v. American Universal Insurance Co.1 0 5 in 1987, two trial courts and one appellate
court have rendered decisions interpreting the clause. In Hybud Equipment Corp. v. Sphere Drake Insurance Co., °6 the appellate court for
Summit County followed the 1984 Buckeye Union case without addressing the rationale which caused courts to move away from this earlier view. 1 7 In a case involving pollution from a landfill, the Hybud
court held that the phrase " 'sudden and accidental' " was a reaffirmation of the principle that coverage will not be provided for intended
results of intentional acts, but will be provided for the unintended re-

99. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
A discharge or release that is brief or lasting only a short time comes within the meaning of
sudden. Id.The Sixth Circuit, applying Michigan law, sent an even stronger signal in F.L. Aerospace v. Aetna Casualty & Surety, 897 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1990), when it affirmed its district
court decision. The court found that the pollution exclusion clause was not ambiguous. Id. The
terms sudden and accidental should be given their plain, everyday meaning. According to the
couit, a sudden and accidental event is something that happens quickly, without warning, and
fortuitously or intentionally. Id. The court noted that the Michigan Supreme Court would, in its
opinion, find that sudden had a temporal component. F.L. Aerospace was cited and followed in
Detrex Chemical Indus. v. Employers Ins., No. C85-2278Y (N.D. Ohio April 12, 1990) (applying
Michigan law). In International Surplus v. Anderson Dev., 901 F.2d 1368 (6th Cir. 1990), the
court held that the leak of a by-product over a three week time span would not be sudden and
accidental. The court found F. L. Aerospace to be controlling. In Grant-SouthernIron & Metal v.
CNA Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1990), the court held that the phrase "sudden and accidental" in exception to the pollution exclusion clause in industrial liability policy has temporal
components.
100. 728 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1317.
103. Id.at 1318.
104. 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (1984).
105. 41 Ohio App. 3d 228, 535 N.E.2d 334 (1987).
106. C.A. No. 14597 (Summit County Ct. App., Jan. 30, 1991) (LEXIS, Ohio library,
Courts file), cert. granted, No. 91-641 (Ohio July 3, 1991).
107. Id.
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suits of intentional acts." 10 8 In other words, the phrase was a restatement of the definition of occurrence. The court specifically noted that
"sudden should not be limited to instantaneous" events.1 0 9 The Ohio
Supreme Court has accepted this case for review. 10
Two opinions have recently emerged from the trial courts in Hamilton County. Judge Nadel granted partial summary judgments to the
insured in Morton-Thiokol, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co."'
Judge Morrissey granted a similar partial summary judgment in related litigation in Morton International v. Harbor Insurance Co."'.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The addition of the Hybud Equipment Corp. v. Sphere Drake Insurance Co.'" appellate decision and the Morton International trial
court decision has not altered Ohio law. Indeed, the status of the law
has remained stagnant since the original Ohio case interpreting the pollution exclusion clause in 1984, Buckeye Union Insurance Co. v. Lib-

erty Solvents & Chemical Co. "' The appellate court in Buckeye Union
analyzed the issues in interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause,
and chose to follow the line of cases that had been developing in New
Jersey. The trend in recent times is clearly away from these early New
Jersey decisions, which held that "sudden and accidental" was ambiguous and superfluous. Therefore, the insurance policies must be con-

108. Id. (citations omitted).
109. Id.
110. Hybud Equipment Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., C.A. No. 14597 (Summit County
Ct. App., Jan. 30, 1991) (LEXIS, Ohio library, Courts file), cert. granted, No. 91-641 (Ohio July
3, 1991); see also Saxton, The Pollution Exclusion Clause in Ohio: Ohio Supreme Court May
Finally Resolve the Issue, 3 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL OF OHIO 10 (1991).
111. No. A8603799 (Hamilton County C.P. March 1, 1990). Morton-Thiokol sought indemnification from its insurers for alleged liability to share the expenses of cleaning up the Summit National Service site in Portage County, Ohio. Id. Judge Nadel drafted a somewhat obscure
opinion which simply stated, as to the pollution exclusion, that "the polluter's exclusion found at
exclusion F in the Aetna policy does not apply to the third party disposal or release of alleged
pollutants." Id. The court did not offer any citations to case law; however, it obviously relied upon
the 1984 Buckeye Union case in which the peculiar phrase "polluter's exclusion" appears. This
order granting plaintiff partial summary judgment was appealed to the First Appellate District,
sitting in Hamilton County, Ohio. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. C-900283
(Hamilton County Ct. App. Oct. 2, 1991). The appellate court reversed and remanded the judgment based upon the trial court's improper application of Ohio law instead of Pennsylvania law.
Id. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 188 (1971); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ferrin, 21 Ohio St. 3d 43, 487 N.E.2d 568 (1986).
112. A-8903914 (Hamilton County C.P. Feb. 4, 1991). The court held that "the polluter's
exclusion . . . does not apply to the third party disposal or release of alleged pollutants." Id.
Again, this case appears to be based on Buckeye Union.
113. C.A. No. 14597 (Summit County Ct. App., Jan. 30, 1991) (LEXIS, Ohio library,
Courts file), cert. granted, No. 91-641 (Ohio July 3, 1991).
17 Ohio App. 1990
3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (1984).
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strued against insurers and in favor of coverage. Numerous state supreme courts have penned comprehensive and well-researched opinions
in which the justices have refused to contort the clear meaning of "sudden and accidental" into an ambiguity. Our federal courts, charged
with the responsibility of applying state law not necessarily as the state
trial courts and courts of appeals have applied it, but as the high court
of the state would apply it if presented with the issue, have nearly
unanimously held that the pollution exclusion clause is not ambiguous.
The federal courts from Ohio, Michigan, and Rhode Island have been
charged with the responsibility of making an in-depth analysis and deciding issues in the way they believe the state high courts would decide
them. Although the state courts need not be persuaded by federal decisions, such judicial decisions should not be overlooked, just as lower
state court decisions are considered by the federal courts. The uniform
trend evidenced by the recent federal court decisions is but one more
indicator of the consensus of all courts in the interpretation of the standard language within the pollution exclusion clause.
The reliance by Ohio courts on Buckeye Union is no longer justified. Ohio courts have revisited the Buckeye Union decision but have
never comprehensively and critically reviewed the. underpinnings of the
decision. Such a review would reveal that the decision is based upon
older cases which have been criticized even within the jurisdictions in
which those cases were decided. The Hybud case presents to the Ohio
Supreme Court this opportunity to make a thorough review of Buckeye
Union.
Ohio jurists must start with a clean slate and make a new and
independent analysis of the law. The interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause is not philosophical, political or economic. Our courts are
not in place to legislate insurance coverage, to re-write the English language, or to equate "insurance policy" with "insurance coverage." The
court's role is to analyze the law and apply the law to the facts. If that
is done, the result will be that all vestiges of Buckeye Union and Ohio's
contortion of the "polluter's exclusion" will be respectfully left behind
in it's rightful place in the 1980s.
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